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ABSTRACT
Accurate channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter
is critical for maximizing spectral efficiency on the downlink
of multi-antenna networks. In this work we analyze a novel
form of physical layer attacks on such closed-loop wireless
networks. Specifically, this paper considers the impact of de-
liberately inaccurate feedback by malicious users in a mul-
tiuser multicast system. Numerical results demonstrate the
significant degradation in performance of closed-loop trans-
mission schemes due to intentional feedback of false CSI by
adversarial users.
Index Terms— Physical layer security, feedback, multi-
cast beamforming, multiuser downlink, Byzantine attack.
1. INTRODUCTION
Effective interference management and spatial multiplexing
of data in multiuser wireless systems is greatly dependent
upon the accuracy of channel state information (CSI) at the
transmitter. The use of feedback from receivers in multiuser
wireless networks has now become a well-established tech-
nique to provide CSI at the transmitter [13]. A number of
analyses of imperfect feedback scenarios motivated by prac-
tical considerations are available, such as partial CSI feedback
[2], limited-rate feedback [3], noisy feedback [4], and delayed
feedback [5].
However, the problem considered in this paper is signifi-
cantly different. Since the performance advantage of closed-
loop transmission schemes over their open-loop counterparts
is completely determined by the quality of the CSI, this opens
the door to deliberate misreporting of CSI by malicious users
as a novel form of a physical layer attack. Jamming and
eavesdropping are the traditional categories of physical layer
attacks in the literature, and have been widely studied for
multi-antenna systems [6]. To the author’s best knowledge
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this is the first work to investigate physical layer attacks on
MIMO systems based on malicious feedback of CSI.
In particular, we examine malicious or poisoned feedback
attacks on the downlink of a multi-antenna network that is
multicasting a common message to multiple receivers. The
message being transmitted has no intrinsic value for the at-
tacker; the malicious user is only interested in compromising
the Quality-of-Service (QoS) provided to the legitimate re-
ceivers. In network security parlance, malicious behavior by
authenticated users from within the network are referred to
as ‘Byzantine attacks’, and have usually been studied at the
network and transport layers [7].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
multicast network model and the adversarial user’s capabili-
ties are described in Sec. 2. The various forms of malicious
feedback based on the corresponding objectives of the trans-
mitter are listed in Sec. 3. Numerical results that depict the
impact of poisoned feedback are shown in Sec. 4, and conclu-
sions drawn in Sec. 5.
2. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The network under consideration is comprised of a Nt-
antenna transmitter multicasting to K˜ legitimate receivers
and a single malicious user, all equipped with a single an-
tenna1 each, such that K˜ + 1 = K is the total number of
receiving nodes.
In the general multicast scenario, a common scalar infor-
mation symbol z of unit power is transmitted to all K re-
ceivers. This necessitates the use of a commonNt×1 transmit
beamformer u with with power constraint ||u||2
2
≤ P . Com-
pared to the broadcast scenario of independent information
per receiver, the multicast beamforming problem was shown
to be NP-hard [8]. This led to the development of a number of
1It is straightforward to extend the principle of poisoned feedback to the
case where each receiver is also equipped with an antenna array, for which
multicasting strategies have been proposed in [11, 12].
approximate solutions based on techniques such as semidefi-
nite programming, for instance [8]-[11].
The Nt × 1 transmitted signal is
x = uz. (1)
The received signals in a flat fading scenario are
yk = hkuz + nk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
where hk is the 1 × Nt channel state vector for user k, and
nk is additive white Gaussian noise with variance σ2k. Due
to the absence of inter-user interference, the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) is the primary figure of merit:
SNRk =
hkuu
HhH
k
σ2
k
. (3)
We focus on the following potential transmitter objectives
in a multicast scenario:
1. Minimization of the transmit power subject to a mini-
mum SNR threshold per receiver.
2. Maximization of the average received SNR for all re-
ceivers.
3. Maximization of the minimum user SNR (max-min)
under the total power constraint P .
4. Maximization of the minimum information rate under
the total power constraint P .
Objectives 3 and 4 are equivalent for the case of a
single multicast group as in this work. To achieve any
of the above system objectives, the transmitter requires
global channel state information of all K receivers H =[
h1 . . . hK˜ ha
]
, where the subscript a denotes the
malicious adversary. On the other hand, the malicious user
seeks to degrade the system performance objectives to the
best of its ability by manipulating the CSI it feeds back.
We assume that all K˜ legitimate receivers truthfully trans-
mit their CSI to the transmitter over a error-free public feed-
back link. Moreover, this global CSI is also known to the
malicious user via eavesdropping. The transmitter is assumed
to be unaware of the presence of the malicious user and seeks
to service all active receivers, i.e., user selection is not con-
sidered. The formulation of the resultant poisoned feedback
ha from the malicious user is described in the next section.
3. POISONED FEEDBACK
3.1. Transmit Power Minimization
In this scenario, the transmitter seeks to minimize its trans-
mit power required to satisfy a pre-determined minimum SNR
target γ for each receiver. On the other hand, the malicious
user seeks to maximize the resource consumption at the trans-
mitter. Towards this end, a crude attack would be to de-
mand a very high QoS threshold relative to the legitimate re-
ceivers. However, such anomalous attacks are easy to iden-
tify, and at the very least would result in the malicious user
being dropped from the set of scheduled receivers. Therefore,
we consider a more subtle attacker, who seeks to feed back
the worst possible channel state information so as to maxi-
mize the power consumption at the transmitter.
The malicious user has the following relaxed optimization
problem:
max
he
min
u
trace
(
uuH
)
s.t. trace
(
uuHhkh
H
k
)
> γ, k = 1, . . . ,K
trace
(
uuH
)
≤ P
‖ha‖
2
2
≥ β,
(4)
where an additional norm constraint has been placed on ha
by the attacker to avoid anomalous feedback values. Define
D , heh
H
e
, U , uuH , and Gk , hkhHk . Introducing an
auxiliary variable t, we have the following SDP relaxation for
the attacker:
min
D
−t
s.t. trace (U) > t
trace (UGk) > γ
trace (D) > β
(5)
Due to the relaxation of the rank-1 constraint on the transmit
covariance, a randomization step is often required after the
optimization in (5). This implies that the attacker may not be
able to compute the same beamformer as the transmitter.
3.2. Maximization of Average Received SNR
Under this transmitter objective, the attacker adopts the fol-
lowing:
min
ha
max
u
uHHHuH
σ2
k
s.t. ‖u‖
2
2
= P
For the transmitter’s maximization problem, a closed-form
solution exists for the optimal beamformer u, namely the
principle eigenvector of HHH [9].
Intuitively, what the attacker should do here is to choose
ha to be very large and orthogonal to all of the other legiti-
mate channel vectors. The transmit beamformer would then
approach ha, and all of the other users would see their allo-
cated power approach zero.
3.3. Maximization of Minimum SNR
An alternative attack would be to minimize the maximum
SINR enjoyed by any of the legitimate receivers.
min
he
max
u
min
k
trace
(
uuHhkh
H
k
)
for k = 1, . . . ,K,
s.t. trace
(
uuH
)
≤ P
‖ha‖
2
2
≥ β.
(6)
Broadly speaking, from the transmitter’s perspective the
optimal beamformer can be expressed as a linear combination
of the user’s channel state vectors:
uH =
K∑
k=1
αkhk,
where the complex coefficients αk can be obtained using a
sequential quadratic program [9].
However, instead of posing the above problem as another
SQP or SDP which are known to be computationally intensive
[10], we assume the attacker employs an iterative algorithm
that alternatively optimizes ha for a fixed u, and vice versa.
The inner optimization for the transmit beamformer can be
carried out based on the iterative SNR-increasing update algo-
rithm in [10, Sec. VI]. The attacker initializes the algorithm
with an arbitrary channel vector and obtains the correspond-
ing u for this initial global CSI matrix H. After this step, the
new candidate for ha is obtained using a line search of ap-
propriate step size in order to find the worst-case feedback in
terms of the minimum SNR. These iterations continue until a
pre-determined stopping criterion.
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The following simulation results are compiled using 1000
Monte Carlo trials per point. The channel vectors for all
links are composed of independent Gaussian random vari-
ables with zero mean and unit variance. The background
noise power is assumed to be the same for all K receivers and
the eavesdropper: σ2
k
= 1. All SNR and rate results shown
here correspond to the K˜ legitimate receivers only, since the
attacker has no value for the transmitted information as stated
previously.
Fig. 1 displays the contrast between the total transmit
power required to meet a modest SNR target of γ = 5dB
per receiver when all receivers report their CSI accurately,
and when a single malicious user is present. It is evident
that the attacker is able to waste a significant portion of the
transmitter’s power.
Fig. 2 exhibits the performance loss in terms of maximum
average received SNR in dB of the legitimate users due to
poisoned feedback, with K˜ = 5 receivers. The attacker is
able to starve the other receivers of allocated power on the
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Fig. 1. Transmit power fraction versus number of receivers
K , P=20dB, Nt = 5 antennas.
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Fig. 2. Maximum average SNR versus transmit power P ,
Nt = 5 antennas.
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Fig. 3. Minimum information rate versus number of receivers
K , P=20dB, Nt = 4 antennas.
downlink, and reduces overall QoS levels by up to 3dB even
for large transmit powers.
Fig. 3 shows the maximized minimum information rates
for the closed-loop systems with completely accurate and poi-
soned feedback, and the open-loop multicast downlink with
isotropic transmission [13], respectively. The maximized
minimum information rate is defined as
max
D
min
16k6K˜
log
2
(1 + SNRk) .
The interesting observation here is that the presence of just
a single malicious user drives the system performance signif-
icantly below that achievable without any feedback whatso-
ever.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a preliminary investigation of the vul-
nerability of feedback-based downlink systems to malicious
CSI reporting. It is observed that deliberate feedback of the
worst possible CSI can lead to a closed-loop system perfor-
mance that is considerably worse than that achieved by open-
loop multicasting without CSI feedback. Therefore, smart
detection and repudiation techniques to validate feedback of
CSI at the physical layer are necessary as highlighted by the
numerical results. Numerous avenues exist for future work,
namely the closed-loop broadcast scenario with independent
information for receivers.
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